National Security Officials and Maritime Leaders Convene to Combat Irregular Warfare at the Maritime & Transportation

National Security Officials and Maritime Leaders Convene to Combat Irregular Warfare at the Maritime & Transportation

Story by: Pedro A. Rodriguez, Irregular Warfare Center Public Affairs, Ctr. MIAMI — July 14, 2026 - National security and maritime leaders convened at Port Miami, Fla. on July 14-15 to discuss measures and strategies to counter irregular warfare threats targeting U.S. ports and shipping. Hosted by the Irregular Warfare Center (IWC), the workshop focused on identifying critical strategic gaps and building a cross-functional network between public and private sectors to counter and identify emerging threats like port sabotage, cyberattacks, and foreign exploitation of commercial logistics networks.

The conference sought to address vulnerabilities across U.S. ports, inland waterways, and maritime logistics networks. Organizers emphasized the urgent need for integrated solutions to protect the homeland from asymmetric tactics that blur the lines between commercial maritime activity and nation-state security threats.

Senior Advisor for Global Sustainment, Contested Logistics and Offensive Supply Chain Operations U.S. Army Maj. Gen Retired Edward Dorman III said that it takes a joint, interagency, multinational, and commercial effort to secure our ports and that the IWC has been given guidance through documents like the National Defense Strategy to deter the pacing threat, known as the People’s Republic of China, while increasing burden-sharing and partnerships with partners and allies.

“When you think about the maritime domain, and you're asking about the infrastructure, it is predominantly privately owned, but there are strategic ports that are designated in the United States,” said Dorman.

Day one sessions delved into severe domestic maritime vulnerabilities, including insider threats within logistics companies, the convergence of maritime information technology (IT) and operational technology (IT/OT), and the rising risk of cyberattacks. Security experts highlighted specific tactics used by adversaries, such as Automatic Identification System (AIS) spoofing, Global Positioning System (GPS) manipulation, and hacking into critical port systems like cranes and automated cargo networks.

U.S. Navy Capt. Vincent D’Eusanio, Office of Strategic Sealift U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration Liaison, said that there is a culture gap between the shipping industry and their local, federal law enforcement and defense agencies and that gap is the expectation of being a target.

“I think what happens is we have a fundamental good versus evil,” D’Eusanio said. “When you're in the military and you see an adversary coming, you know you're a target, you have a different posture, you set your security differently, your training is different.”

He also spoke about the awareness of civilian employees about the threats all around them. D’Eusanio stated that civilian workers go to a nine-to-five job thinking that they’re just going to operate a crane, drive the truck or pull the ship in and out. However, they are not aware of the possibilities of being targets.

“Some of the vulnerabilities, you have good people going to do good work, and they could be either threatened by something that they don't normally expect to happen at work, or they could even be assisting with some of that stuff unknowingly,” said D’Eusanio.

Another discussion topic was the insider threat and human intelligence or HUMINT in maritime operations. Panelists from the FBI and Department of War agencies and commands spoke about the limitations of baseline credentialing systems like transportation worker identification credential cards, which only verify identity rather than actively monitoring insider threat risks. They emphasized the rising threat of non-traditional collectors, specifically from adversarial nations such as China, Russia, and Iran who exploit academic, business, and logistics networks to target and manipulate unwitting port personnel.

The discussion focused on how these threat actors co-opt civilian workers through financial stress, blackmail, or deceptively legitimate business ventures to steal sensitive technology and intellectual property. Ultimately, panelists advocated for a layered security model that incorporates role-based access, active behavioral monitoring, and stronger, trust-based collaboration with federal agencies like the FBI to identify these human vulnerabilities before they are exploited.

The remainder of the workshop centered on looking toward the future of maritime mobility and defense. Discussions focus on the deployment of uncrewed underwater and surface vehicles (UUVs/USVs), data defense strategies using advanced artificial intelligence and satellite imagery, and protecting physical vulnerabilities like undersea cables, pipelines, and bridge chokepoints.

In the Irregular and Hybrid Maritime Warfare: Implications for Special Operations panel, panelists discussed the U.S. special operations’ role in the littoral environment, maritime sabotage prevention, counter-UUV operations, and uncrewed maritime threats.

Michael Poppa from Atlas Motion Systems emphasized the importance of quick production to counter maritime threats and the challenges this can face when attempting to deploy assets.

“The ideal solution is clear: we need low-cost, mass-producible, and easily deployable systems capable of rapid target detection,” said Poppa. “However, the real challenge lies in execution. Navigating bureaucratic procurement cycles and getting regulatory bodies to deploy these assets into the correct Areas of Operations (AOs) especially given the complex geopolitical relationships within some of these AOs is a slow process.”

Through this conference the IWC was able to convene key stakeholders in the IW field and the maritime security domain and create a framework for ongoing cooperation to protect the homeland against maritime IW threats.